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FORMS OF ANGLO-SAXON CONTRACTS AND
THEIR SANCTIONS:
II.

THE WARRANTY CONTRACTS.

Jncl11ding (a) Warranty of Title, and (b) Warranty of Quality . .
Perhaps the most primitive commercial transaction affecting legal
rights was the executed barter; in a more advanced state when
money had been introduced, the executed sale.
In the very earliest Anglo-Saxon period of which we have knowledge such transactions might involve contractu~l rights. For ·instance we read in the laws of King AETHELBERT,53 "If man buy a
maiden· with cattle, let the. bargain stand, if it be without guile; but
if there be guile, let him bring.her home again, and let .his property
be restored to him." The •bargain,. if there ·ha!? been gu_ile, has not
been ·executed ·properly. There is then a right of rescission. The
laws clearly.state a lega:l right of t~e party defrauded to hi,ive his
original property restored to him.
.
. .
What was 'the nature of st~ch ·right,, and how· was "it enforced?
From our modern point of view it is· contractual. The prop~rty in
the maiden and in the cattle had passed. An obligation, at the option
of the defrauded party, rested ·on both parties to revest the pr-0perty
exchanged. · But it may at once occur to the n~ader -th:;i.t primitive
men did not fook upon the matter from our _modern viewpoint. Perhaps the defrauded party conceived of his claim for restitution a~.
"real." He demanded the return of his own. As a matter of fact
such was not the case, if we may judge from AngJo-Saxon procedure. There were only two kinds of proceedings which could be
brought for a chattel. One .was the property procedure involving
a charge .of theft. The other was Debt. . In the case in question the
first cleai:ly could not be brought, for the chattels had been parted
with with consent. If the second were brought it would have to be
based on a contract.5 .r So if either party could sue it must have been
on a contract right. If we take as an example a case of failure of
title the matter is still clearer. A buys a cow from B; it turns out
that B hatf no title. B is under obligation to give A another cow of
the same value.54" Certainly if A sues B it is not upon a "real"
right.
But it seems proba•ble that in the early law no direct action was
available for B where there was a failure of title. And where there

a

· .. Continued from the May issue.
.. Aethelbert, 71.
u Laughlin, r96.
Gta Cf. Glanvil, III, c. 1.
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was a breach of warranty of quality there was a provision for a special issue on the point. How do such procedural facts then affect
the question as to the nature of right? In case of failure of title
it would seem that judicial recognition was.at first indirect. The
law started with the composition procedure above described. 55 By
it the first legal needs of society were met, namely redress for
assault, battery, and homicide. It was not long, however, before
trouble caused by stealing, particularly cattle-stealing, gave serious
concern, and we get the theft-procedure. The composition procedure, as we have seen, was set in motion by demanding justice,
backed up by threats of vengeance. Thereby the defendant was
induced to enter into the procedural contract, with sureties. The
theft-pi;ocedure was begun by demanding property as ones own.
The defendant would then have to give it up, or give sureties to
insure his proving that it was his own.
A sues B for the recovery of a stolen cow. One plea that B may
set up in defense is that he bought the cow from a designated party,
C. If B can produce C, <\nd C admits the sale, B may give the cow
into C's hands and the suit will then proceed against the latter, thus
freeing B from the charge.56 Suppose then C succeeds in defending
the charge of theft, but is una:ble to prove ownership or to produce
his own wa:rrantor. In that case C will have to give up the cow to A.
The procedure in this matter we find early, in the laws of
HLOTHAER and EADRIC 7, "If any man steal property from another.,
and the owner afterwards lay claim to it; let him vouch to warranty
at the king's hall, if he can, and let him bring thither the person who
sold it to him; if he cannot do that, let him give it up and let the
owner take possession of it."
In our case B has paid C for the cow, what then are B's rights~
Obviously C should give him another cow. It is clear B had such a
right. 56 a But what of an action to enforce it? The purpose of a
suit was to determine a right, not to enforce it, ~nd judgments had
in any case to be collected by the plaintiffs, and not by officers of
the law. What clearer determination, then, of B's rights could be
desired than in the action of theft between A and C? If C cannot
defend his title and gives up the cow to A, he must, of course,
compensate B.
But what will compel C to compensate B? The very same sureties who held c to his obligation of warranty, who compel him to
take B's place in the theft charge brought by A. For certainly the
""Ante, page 554·5·
"' Oaths 3, Ethelred II., 9 •
... Cf. Glanvil, III, c. r.
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claiming of the chattel in B's hands will itself be no constraint upon
C. To get him to court there must be a different set of sureties
from those given to release A's demand for the thing claimed to
be stolen.
There might, however, be a preliminary issue which would have
to be settled. C might deny the sale of the particular cow and refuse to accept it back. Provision for such an issue is found in !NE
75; ''If a man attach stolen property, and the person with whom it
is attached then vouch another man to warranty; if then the man
will not accept it, and says that he never sold him that, "but sold him
other; then must he prove who vouches it to that person, that he
sold to him none other, but that same."
A further issue may be suggested, for may not C deny having sold
B any cow? In the first Anglo-Saxon period such an issue could
not have occurred. For as has been shown,57 you could not get a
defendant before the court on a contract claim unless you had taken
sureties at the time of the making of the contract. So if the defendant was in court, brought there by his sureties, there could ·be no
question of the defendant having sold the plaintiff something, for
otherwise the sureties would not have required him to 'answer, in
fact there would have been no sureties. At a later time, when
sureties were provided to hold a man to every justice, it might happen that a defendant would deny having sold anything to the plaintiff and that there would consequently be such an issue.58
. In the guile case a need was early felt for the direct determination
of an issue raised ·by a breach of warranty of quality, as the matter
could not be incidentally settled as in the failure of title case.
Vve read in !NE 56, "if a man buy any kind of cattle and he then
discover any unsoundness in it within XXX days; then let him
throw the cattle on his vendor's hands, or let the latter swear that
he knew not of any"unsoundness in it when he sold it to him."
The oaths used in the suit wel:"e as follows:
Plaintiff's oath: "In the name of Almighty God, thou didst engage to me sound and clear that which thou soldest to me, and full
security against after-claim, on the witness of N., who then was
with us two." 59
Defendant's oath: "In the name of Almighty God, I knew not, in
the ~hings about which thou suest, foulness or fraud, or infirmity or
01

See supra, page 562.

a Cf. Glanvil, X, c. 15, "But if he have made default in his warranty, then there

will be a plea between the purchaser and his warrantor, so that matlers may arrive
at a duel"
11 Oaths X.
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blemish, up to that day's-tide that I sold it to thee; but it was both
sound and clean, without any kind of fraud." 60
The plaintiff's claim is based on the defendant's engagement. The
denial first asserts good faith, the absence of knowledge on the defendant's part, and then ends with a flat denial of unsoundness. The
action looks like one for fraud, but it only covers such frauds as
arise out of contracts of sale. :fhe wrong is a breach of contract.
\Vhat were the formalities of the contract violated by failure to
give good title, and by the giving of unsound goods with an engagement of soundness? And what were their sanctions? How were
defendants brought to court?
We may suppose that ·barters or sales took place at first without
any formalities except such as were inherent in the nature of the·
transaction. Each party formally delivered goods to the other.
But at a very early date witnesses became an essential part of the
ceremony. Were they necessary in order that title might pass?
Probably. The laws prescribed them. In HLOTHAER and EADRIC
16, we read, "If any Kentish-man buy a chattel in Lunden-wic, let
him then have two or three true men to witness, or the king's wicreeve." And all through the Anglo-Saxon laws are to be found
similar provisions.61 Also a fine was prescribed for dealings without witnesses. 62 And when a man bought cattle when out on a journey there were minute provisions for declaring the matter to his
neighbors upon his return, and heavy penalties, forfeiture of life
and property, for failure to do so. 63
The primary object of the witnesses was as a safeguard against
theft. The purchaser needed them in order to defend against a
charge of theft.
In the second place, they were of use in proving that a defendant
was vendor and warrantor of title, in case an issue was taken on
that point. They thus en~bled a purchaser to compel his vendor to
defend in his place; and were also witnesses of the vendor's obligation to compensate his vendee in case the chattel had to be given up
on the claim of a third party.
The matter of witnesses then, at least in all important sales,there were exceptions in matters of trifling values 6 4,-was so rigidly
prescribed and of such practical importance, that we may fairly conclude that a sale or delivery without witnesses was imperfect and
.. Oaths XI.
Aethclstan, I, IO, I2; Edgar, Supp. 6.
o2 Aethelstan, I, Io. ·
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"'See Aethelstan, I, I2-where witnesses are required for sales ol property over
XX pence in value.
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did not give the vendee the full property. A matter, which for centuries was required by law and custom, must in the popular mind
have become an essential of validity.
Also, in the later law at any rate, sureties were required in executed sales. In ETHELRED I, 3, we read: "And let no man either
buy or exchange, unless he have sureties and witnesses; but if any
one do so, let the land-lord take possession of and hold the property,
till that it be known who rightfully owns it." When such a' stage
has ·been reached, and in practice we may take it the expedient of
requiring sureties of a vendor must have very early been resorted to,
the form of the executed contract of sale becomes precisely that of
the formal surety contract. The ceremony of the wed with the giving of sureties is gone through with with witnesses. The two contracts are completely assimilated. And such is quite what we
should expect. The surety contract was regularly employed for
matters which were purposely left executory on one side. \i\ihy
should it not be used for transactions which were intended to be
fully executed, but which might turn out not to have been so?
It is submitted that we have here an additional proof that the
obligations of vendors tci make good for failure of title or for unsoundness were strictly contractual. We need not rely on the procedure for the enforcement of such rights alone. The form of the
transaction clinches the point.
·
But why have sureties? For exactly the same reason as in the
unilateral, or partly executed, contract. How was one to get his
warrantor to court, if he was unwilling to come voluntarily?
Obviously, .by the procedural contract made in advance, with sure.ties. The ability of a vendee to force his vendor to ·submit to the
jurisdiction of a court was of the most vital importance. If he could
get him there he could force him to take the chattel claimed as
stolen, and defend in the vendee's place. In case· the vendor was
forced to give up the chattel to 'the claimant in the theft suit, the
same sureties were "at hand to compel him to give another of equal
value to his vendee.
So although the earliest laws mention only witnesses and not sureties, the latter were of such importance that we may conclude they
were early employed. Unless they were, we can hardly say that
there were warranty contracts in connection with the sale. It
might happen that a vendor who had not given sureties would be
willing to defend in his vendee's place, but the chances were against
it, for by doing so he would run the risk of ·being convicted of theft
himself, and it was most likely that it was for the express purpose
of avoiding such an obligation that he omitted to give sureties.
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If he voluntarily came forward, and lost the chattel to the claimant, it might be that the judgment against him would require him
to give sureties, as security for compensating the vendee. If so, his
contractual obligation would begin with the giving of such sureties.
But it may well be doubted whether a court would compel the giving
of sureties, or render any judgment to compensate the purchaser
against the seller, if the latter had not assumed such obligation in
the first instance by a formal surety contract.
Were these warranty contracts express or implied, and was there
any difference in that respect between the warranty of title and the
warranty of quality?
In the first place, the caution should be made that it was the form
in both .cases which gave validity and not words, express or implied:
vVe must put aside any preconceptions that we may have from our
familiarity with consensual contracts, for it was centuries later before they were recognized in England. To talk about suing on contracts express, implied in fact, or implied in law, would be an
anachronism. The question is simply: did every vendor who could
be sued have to expressly guarantee his title, and the soundness of
the goods he sold, or were such warranties a part of every sale regardless of whether the vendor said anything or not?
It is submitted, that when the procedural contract was entered
into, i. e. when there were not only witnesses, but also sureties, that
the vendor did say something. Or at any rate, that in every sale in
which sureties were given there was a warranty. If the vendor was
unwilling to warrant he could refuse to give sureties on that express
understanding. There would of course be witnesses, for they were
necessary to protect the vendee from the charge of theft. But if
the vendor had no intention to defend in his vendee's place, and to
compensate him if the· chattel were lost through a third party's
claim, he could quit-claim by refusing to give sureties. As to the
warranty of quality, it would seem likely that express words were
used, for the oath used for the declaration ran: "In the name of
Almighty God, thou dids't engage to me sound and clean that which
thou soldest to me, and full security against after-claim, on the witness of N. who then was with us two.'' 65 The action is on the promise and apparently on an express engagement to make good in case
there was unsoundness.
·
What was testified to by the transaction witness was what he saw
and heard, 66 so if t~e suit was for breach of warranty, we may take
es Oaths 7•
.. Oaths 8.
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it that he testified to words of warranty, or at least to what the
agreement was, as evidenced by what the parties said.
It may be said then, that in every case in which a right for breach
of warranty existed, there had ·been a surety contract entered into
at the time of the sale, and suit, if brought, was upon such contract.
In all cases where he gave sureties, the vendor probably actually
warranted, usually expressly. In failure of title cases, it might not
have been of great importance what he said, for the very fact that
he sold and gave sureties showed that he warranted the title. In
warranty of quality cases, the words, no doubt, were of greater
significance, were perhaps essential for the right.
It is felt to be justifiable to place the warranty contracts in the
first period of Anglo-Saxon law, even though it is not clear that
sureties were required by law in executed sales until the reign of
King EDGAR, for the rights created by breach are very early mentioned. In the case quoted from the laws of AETHELBERT 67 in which
a man who bought a maiden with cattle and found that there was
guile, was declared to have a right to have his property restored to
him, it seems certain that the forms of the surety contract were used.
The wed ceremony was, as far back as we have any record, a part of
the betrothal ceremony. It is from wed that our word ·'wedding·•
is derived. So both the purchaser of the maiden and the relatives
who sold her must have given sureties. 68 And it seems not unfair
to conclude that such was the common practice at that early day in
all important sales.
III. THE CONTRACT OF COURT RECORD.
Then there was the contract by court record. The first reference
to it seems to be in the laws of King INE. 69 It is entirely natural
to expect to find this the first type of contract with the state ·behind
it. Just as the criminal jurisdiction of the crown grew from a king's
peace which first included only acts committed in the king's presence
or in his household, and gradually extended over other places, e. g.,
to the king's highways and rivers, over specially designated times,
and special persons, until finally the king's protection covered the
whole realm; so the protection of contracts ·by the state began with
those entered into in the presence of the king or his magistrates,
or in the courts.
The formalities of the surety contract were observed. In !NJ~ 1370
01 Aethelbert, 77.
"' Cf. the ceremony given fully in the Laws of Edmund •
., Ine 13.
,. Liebermann, VoL I. p. 95.
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we read : "If anyone is untrue to his oath given before the bishop
or breaks the promise entered into in his presence by the wed ceremony let him pay 120 shillings."
The object of making the contract in the bishop's presence was
to give it greater sanction than it would otherwise have had. By
making it in the presence of an ecclesiastic the religious sanction was
emphasized. But there was no separate ecclesiastical jurisdiction at
this time. Bishops presided over lay courts.71 ·So the contract
referred to, in addition to any religious weight which may have
been conferred upon it by the particular magistrate in question, had
behind it the power of the state.
Again in AL~'RED 312 we read: "If anyone breaks a suretyship
guaranteed by the king, let him pay whatever is right to the complainant, and 5 pounds in silver to the king. If he break a suretyship secured by an archbishop, or his protection, let him pay a fine
of 3 pounds. The breaking of the guarantee or protection of any
other bishop or of an ealdorman shall be paid for by a fine of 2
pounds."
We have the same phenomenon here as in the passage from the
laws of INE. If a. surety contract is made in the presence of the
king or other magistrate, and is broken, a heavy fine must be paid.
In the case of the magistrates other than the king the same fine is
prescribed for a breach of protection. A lordless man or one without relatives to become his sureties might flee to a magistrate. The
latter might then take him under protection and become surety for
him. If the pursued then defaulted, he was subject to the above
prescribed fines.
In the passages ci~ed it is not clear whether sureties were required or not, whether it would be sufficient to give a substantial wed
as a pledge, or perhaps whether the ceremony alone, with a symbolic
wed, would do. It is submitted that all three possibilities were used
on occasion. The natural thing in the usual case would ·be to require sureties. In some instances there could be no objection to
receiving a substantial pledge instead. In such a case the magistrate would naturally keep the pledge himself. Even without either
sureties or pledge, the making of the contract in the magistrate's
presence would be sanctioned by the threatened fine. Sometimes
the magistrate would be willing, not only when the debtor was a
friend or person of standing, but also when he was a poor man who
had fled to him for protection, to become surety for him. In such
n Pollock & Maitland's Hist. Eng. Law. I. 16.
"Liebermann, 51.
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a case if protection was granted the magistrate himself would have
to see to it that the debtor did his part.
In the last situation it might be asked, was the magistrate personally liable? Certainly not if he was the king; but a lesser magistrate probably was. Note the difference between the two in the
passage cited from King ALFRED. As to magistrates other than the
king there is a provision both for the ·breach of a guaranty of suretyship, and for nmnd-bryce or breach of protection. In the former
case the magistrate exacted sureties, or a substantial pledge. In
such a case he was not personally liable. In the latter case he took
the defendant under his protection, in other words, he became surety
for him, in just the same way every lord was under obligation to
become surety for his dependents.73
The contract so made before a judicial magistrate was essentially
a contract of court record. It was the fact that it was made in court
which distinguished it from other contracts. In an important respect it differed from later contracts of record; that is, the sanction
was indirect. It was a fine exacted by the state for its breach.

B.-890 A. D.

IV.

To

1027 A. D.

THE CONTRACT OF PLIGHTED FAITH.

In the laws of King ALFRED we get the first mention of a contract which did not depend on sureties for its force. The surety
employed was Deity.
"If any one complains of another that l].e has broken a promise
made with God as a surety, and says that the party complained of.
has not fulfilled his promise, let him take an oath to that effect in
four churches; and if the defendant wishes to clear himself let him
take an oath in twelve churches."74
Although the quotation is from the lay and not from the ecclesiastical part of ALFRED'S dooms, the matter appears to be one of
Church jurisdiction rather than one for the lay courts. The procedure is much like that employed in the lay courts, and perhaps
indicates a church jurisdiction over contracts which continued in
operation until put an end to by the Constitutions of Clarendon in
A. D., 1164.
However that may be, there was without doubt a common practice
of attempting to give promises sanction by the performance of the
wed ceremony, without the giving of human sureties. For example,
As in Ethelred l, r.
n Alfred 33, Liebermann, Vol. I, 67.

73
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we see the great men of the Witan giving their weds to the Arch··
bishop to make binding their promises to do justice and to see that
the laws are executed.75 The members of town and· gild organizations gave each other their weds to confirm their solemn promises
to abide by the peace of and the rules of group or organization.70
If there were no ecclesiastical penalties suffered for breach of
su~h obligations, we may conclude there were none, other than those
of social pressure and public opinion. For there is nothing to indicate that ·the state ever gave any aid, other than perhaps some approval or support, to the ecclesiastical tribunals. It seems reasonably
certain that such contracts wer~ not actionable in the lay courts.71

V. TH-E PLEDGE CONTRACT.
Predsely when the pledge contract arose may be difficult to say,
but how and why it arose may be explained. It is placed in the
second period for the reason that there is nothing to show it was
used in the first. Like the surety contract, it could be used for
procedural purposes, and was perhaps first used in that way.78 !t
seems to have been a modified form of the surety c_ontract. _It might
sometimes happen that the defendant could find no one willing to
become surety for him. In that case if he had property he could
induce someone to be his surety by placing the sum claimed, or a
sufficient amount of property in the surety's hands. The wed then
instead of •being a worthless symbol, became a substantial pledge.
\i\Then the same contract was· used to secure extra-judicial agree-·
ments there was no particular use for -the surety. A defendant
might be quite unwilling _to place his money or property into the
plaintiff's hands, but it was quite another matter, when, for instance,
he wa.s about to borrow money. There would then be no objection
to the lender holding the pledge himself instead of passing it on to
a third person.
· . .
There can be no doubt that the early pledge was a wed. Wed
is the word for a pledge. And as we find the pledge in the hands of
the pledgee instead of in those of a surety, it must be that its passing
to the surety has been arrested.
Witnesses for such a transaction would seem to be unessential.
They were of no use for making proof in a suit, for as will be
shown, no right of action grew out of the matter. Possibly the
pledgee might demand them in order to defend in case he were
n- Aethelstan, V. Judicia Civitatis Lundoniae, Tenth.
tt Acthelstan, V. Judicia Civitatis Lundoniae, Intro.
11 See an interesting discussion of this contract, there

& Maitland's History of English Law, II, pp. 181-187.
""Ethelred III, 12.

called fides facta, in Pollock
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charged with theft. Or they might 1be required in order that a
formal transfer of the property in the pledge might be made to the
pledgee. But no doubt motives of secrecy would often induce the
making of the transaction in private and without witnesses.
The result of leaving otit the sureties would be to destroy the
actionability of the transaction. There would be no sureties to
compel appearance. But might not the pledge itself be a sufficient
constraint ?79 Yes, if the creditor could sqe the debtor on the debt.
But he could not. EP In the absence _of such a right there would
seem to b.e little chance of an issue being brought b_efore the courts
at the instance of the creditor.
At a later time, when equitable rights in the res had developed,
the situation was of course different. The creditor did in certain
cases have an interest in the thing which might induce him to sue
if there were an appropriate remedy. If the debtor defaulted, the
creditor would wish to make the thing his own. If it had been
transferred to him informally, that is, without a properly witnessed
11ivery of seisin 1-for that was as necessary for chattels as for land
iin the early law,81-it still belonged to the debtor: The creditor
then would wish to foreclose· the debtor's rights, and acquire the
.authority of the court to dispose of the chattel as· his own. In
GLANVIL's time he was given such a r-ight.lllZ Likewise the debtor
was given an equitable right to redeem. 83 Involved in the remedies
also was the matter of the duty of care for the chattel. But in the
Anglo-Saxon regime we need not look for such rights. We must
find a single issue action, or conclude that there was no legal re.dress. And as has been stated the pledgee had no such right. It
certainly would not have •been fair to allow him to recover the debt·
and not to compel him at the same time to return the pledge. But
that would involve more than a single issue, and a rather complex
"one at that, for there would be the question of due care to consider.
lt might be answered as to that, that "an absolute liability could be
imposed on the pledgee and perhaps was. But even so, there would
·be a double issue, for while the pledgee sued for the debt the pledgor '
would ·be suing for the pledge, a situation which the Anglo-Saxon
procedure was not able to contemplate. No contract except a
unilateral one was actiona'ble.
n Cf. Quaere to that effect by G!anvil, X, c. 8.
That was the rule in primitive Germanic law generally. Wigmore, 10 Harv. L.
Rev. 327. Also such was the rule of the Common Law of Glanvil's age, ·Glanvil,
x. c. 8.
m Pollock & Maitland's Hist. F;ng. Law, II, p. 179.
a Glanvil, Book X, c. 8.
83 Glanvil, Book X, c. 9.
81
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If we turq to the plight of the pledgor we find precisely the same
situation, for he could not sue to get back his pledge. First, let us
note that in the case supposed •the pledgee had given no sureties to
compel him to return the pledge. How get. him to court? If the
pledge was more valuable than the money, there would be no constraint in the transaCtion itself, as there might be if the pledgee
wished to sue.
Again, what remedy was available to the pledgor? There were
only two possible actions. One was a property claim normally involving a charge of theft. Tqat certainly cpuld not be brought.
against a. pledgee,, for he l).ad .not. taken the _property without the
own~r's consent. .The other reme.dy was Debt; ,:which W!!S based on
a cont111ct in genere, as LAUGHLIN calls· it,~4 even where the claini
was for the return pf a chattel. In our_principal c;ase the ·pledgee
~as entered.into no su.ch conJract, either a~ surety
as debtor.
.
Furt.hennore, it would not qe fair to allow· the ,pledgor to get
the ies 'without _p~ying. th~ debt, am;l ~~t ~s statea 'above \'{ould in.:volv:e :n;iore that\ one issue,"
. . , . . · "_' · : ·, . " · · ·.
We may conGlu4e, therefore, that the pledger could no more sue
the pledgee, than the pledgee c~i.ild. sue the piedgor. 8~ And t~is. regardless. of ~vh~ther the px:operty in the thing reqtained iri the 'pledgof
or not. For if the propetfy had· pas~ed to tfie pleqgee without a
formal contract foi: its retu~; ~ fortiori ther~· \V1l~ n:o remedy.· , .
When \ve come to GLANVIr.'"S age, it makes' 'a difference whether
the delivery of the chattel \vas formal, so as· to convey the full
seisin or property to the piedgee, or i:i.ot, For instance, the question. of abso11;lte lia:bility or only due .care on th~ part. of the pledge~,
or the necessity; for forec~osure, may depend upon it. But it would
seem that in the age under consideration, the chief difference would
arise in case the pledgor attempted to take ·back the chattel or succeeded .in doing so.· If the chattel were still. his 'own he would not
be guilty of larceny.
·
·
As -to thir4 parties also there might. be a difference. If the
pledgor had parted with the title, it is clear he would have no rigl}t
to bring theft against a taker. 850 That right would ·belong sokly
to the pledgee. But if the pledgee merely had tpe custody, the right
of protection would remain in the pledgor. 86 Als·o ifl:he pledgee had

or

Laughlin, 196.
ss Cf. Wigmore, The Pledge Idea, IO Harv. L. Rev., 327.
ssa But see a different rule in Glanvil, X, c. II. For the older rule see Laughlin, 197·
.. It should perhaps be noted that bailees ordinarily did have the property. Pollock
& Maitland's Hist. Eng. Law, II, 175. It is suggested that wl:ienever th,ey were con·
tract-bound they had the property. But the pledgee in the, case supposed was not
bound by contract and was not suable.
st
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seisin he could give an indefeasible title to a third party, which
would not be the case if he had custody only.
Jf neither party could sue on a pledge contract should we· not
hesitate to call it a contract at all? The matter was executory on
both sides, yet even without external sanction there were good
chances of mutual performance. The debtor was constrained to
pay by his desire to get back the article pledged, which normally
was of greater value than the debt. Unless the disparity in value
was great, the creditor was not strongly tempted to keep the pledge.
He might even prefer his money. Especially would that be the
case where the article pledged had not been formally transferred
with witnesses. Then the pledgee, not being the absolute owner,
would not desire to continue to hold a thing which was not his own.
If the property in the pledge was transferred to the pledgee, if
it was much more valuable than the debt, and if the pledgee was
unscrupulous, he might refuse to allow redemption. But if a pledgor
got himself into such a situation, it was his own fault.
The pledge contract, regardless of the sanction of a right of
action for its breach, was a usable and practical ·business transaction.
And have we not a right to call it a contract? Other contracts,
ninety-nine times out of a hundred, would give rise to no right of
action, because they would be performed. Perhaps in many of the
ninety-nine cases, performance would be due to the knowledge that
a breach would give such a right. Out of a hundred pledge cases,
ninety-nine would he performed because of its inherent sanctions.
What matter if in the hundredth case there was no right of action?
But a pledge transaction could no doubt he made actionable, if
there were two separate surety contracts entered into, one on each
side. When the· money is delivered to the borrower, he may give
sureties for its repayment. Likewise, when the pledge is trans•ferred to the lender, he may he put under sureties for its return.
The property in the res would then pass to the pledgee, and his
liability, being contractual, would be as absolute as that of the
pledgor to pay the money. Just as no amount of hard luck would
e.v;:cuse the payment on the one side, so a similar misfortune should
not excuse on the other. The two contracts were independent. It
is unlikely that performancy on the debtor's part would be considered a condition P.recedent to the obligation of the creditor, as
that would involve a double issue, which could not be settled by
the one-sided proof of Anglo-Saxon debt procedure. The science
of pleading for reducing a controversy to a single issue was still
inchoate. And the rules for awarding proof now to the defendant
and now to the plaintiff according to the result of the pleadings
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seem to have been confined to real property actions. 87 In Debt the
plaintiff asserted that the defendant owed him, and if the latter
defended, it was by a denial. If the pledgee sued the pledgor, the
latter would have to take an oath that he did not owe the money,
without raising the issue of whether the chattel had been returned
or not. Likewise, if the pledgor sued for the chattel, the pledgee
could not defend on the ground of non-payment of the debt.

VI.

THE DELIVERY-PROMISE.

What may be called an informal formal contract arose at some
time during the Anglo-Saxon period. It was like the formal surety
contract except that the wed ceremony did not have to be performed
at the ·time of the making of the contract. If A delivered goods on
credit, or· money by way of loan to B, in a formal way before .wit·nesses, and B at the time promised· to pay A, for the goods or to
return the loan; then if B broke his promise the matter. gave ris~
to an action.
.
..
:This ~ontract might be called "real," but such a name would give
a'n entirely. wrong impression. If. would ii:pport .Roman ideas into
-Germanic law, which should not ·be· done. - The,right of A in. such
·-a: :Contract -was no more "real'' than in any other contract. · 'L'his js
· cle'arly -indicated by the only ·available .action whi!:;h aould. be brought
by the promisee. 88 Some name, however, must ibe given to. the contract to di'stinguish it from the surety contract, for it was. distinct.
'.In the surety contract the surety was the promisor, in the:.contract
.in question it was the debtor who ·wa~ the. promisor. The latter is
·here called.the "-delivery-promise." The delivery of property was a
char~cteristic part of it, and also the promise. To be sure,. a:.:delivery
· and a· pro)llise ·were a part of . the surety.. contract also; but some
name must be chosen which will-suggest.what:i:he substance of the
transaction -was, a'nd· "delivery-promise~' seems adequate for that
·purpose.. -' ·
··
;
.
;_ · This' contract is placed in the second period because it seems improbable that it could have been actionable until the changes in the
administration of ·justice which took pface ·then,89 to-wit, the provision t~at every man should have a surety to hold him to every justice, and the. development of a determination on' the part of the
state ind\cated by the.provisions for "riding" to compel a recalcitrant
.p~rty to give sureties· for appearance in court.
Laughlin, 230 et seq.
See supra, page 553·4·
89 See supra, page 557-8.
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When such a point had been reached it was no longer necessary
to have sureties, provided at its inception, for every contract. There
were sureties already provided for all occasions in which a man's
presence in court was demanded.
That does not mean that men did not have to have specially designated sureties in each particular case in which they were defendants. 00 The difference was that there was an officially designated
group of sureties for every man, and group-responsibility provided
by law, and that the state meant to compel every man of whom justice was demanded to get the required sureties from such group. It
is not suggested that the departure was radical, for prior to such
time there was a general customary obligation on the members of
the kindred to go surety for each other. The difference is this: from
that time on, the matter was no longer to ·be a matter of special
treaty. The procedural contract was made in advance.
This difference in the legal situation should not be expected, however, suddenly to do away with the necessity of forms. What seems
to have taken place is this. The old ceremony was at first used.
The debtor would hand a wed to the creditor and the creditor would
then hand it back to the ·debtor. 01 That, however, no doubt would
after a time appear to the Saxons of that day quite as futile as it·
does to us today. Nothing could be ga:ined by putting a man into the
power of himself. The law had already provided with great strictness that all contracts and sales should be witnessed. 92 And to
prove them it was necessary to produce at least one of the. transaction-witnesses, who took an oath as to what he saw and heard,
de visu et audita.93
The result was that a new contract, the delivery-promise, was
evolved. It was a transaction quite as essentially formal as the
surety contract itself. It did not derive its efficacy from the delivery
as such, ·but from the ceremony of which the delivery was a part.
A part of the ceremony, that of handing over the wed stick, was
omitted, that was all. There was still the formal delivery, the formal
promise, and the witnesses.
·
The suggestion might ~e made that the delivery-promise was
merely ar. arrested sale or barter. For some reason the matter is
not complete. Delivery has taken place on one 'side and not on the
90 Even in Blackstone's day we find the "common bail," all civil suits were started
by the arrest of the defendant, who gave John Doe and Richard Roe as bail. Bl. Comm.
III, 1287.
"'That such proceedings actually happened, see Pollock & Maitland's Hist. Eng.
I.aw, II, 185•
., Aethelstan I, lo, 12. _
oz Oaths 8.
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other. The suggestion seems plausible enough if we do not hesitate
to apply modern notions to ancient transactions. But the danger of
such reasoning cannot too often be warned against. At a much
later time we find the familiar doctrine that when a bargain is
struck for the sale of specific goods the title is at once in the purchaser. Everything is complete except the delivery of the goods
on the one hand and payment of the price on the other. To apply
this doctrine to ancient law we must, of course, narrow down the
case to a unilateral contract, for bilateral contracts were unknown to
the law.94 We must assume that the money has been paid. But then
we encounter the difficulty that in ancient law delivery was absolutely essential for the transfer of property. 95 Even land had to •be
symbolically delivered. So the undelivered goods did not. belong to
the purchaser. Unless we reason in a circle we are starting with a
time in which, if a man did not get the goods or the money bargained for at the time -he parted with his own goods or money,
there was no security unles& he took sureties or a pledge.
· A partially performesJ barter or sale,' in an age of fonns, was· not
likely of itself to give rise·to a: cause of action. The fact that a
need· was felt for it is not sufficient lo assure us that the need was
inet. by an; action. to fit the case..
. It seems quite certa~n 'that such ivci$ riqt the case.' In. the fitst
place the mere ·fact that a vendee _had delivered,-goods and liad not
received the price gave him no"right~ .. It was absqfotely necessary
that deliveiy and promise be: witnessed. For· instance, ill AETHELsTA~ I, ro we read, "And let no ~an ·exch~nge a.rly ,Property "without
the "\vitness· of the 'reeve, or of the niass:.priest,. or of the landlord,
or of the hordere, of other' unlying rrian. If anyone 'so do let hlm
giv~ XXX shillings,_ and let the landlorq take permission of the 'exchange.'~ Evei;i ·an executed exchange required witnesses. The same
\\'.aS a· fortiori the rule where the transaction W(.lS executory On one
s_ide. The 'delivery as .such gave no rights. It was the witnessed
cei:emony which did that.. '
.
' . .
Furthermore, the surety contract itself was prescribed for sales
as late as the reign .of King ETHELRED, 980;-roI.6. ETHELRED- I, 3
reads, "And let no man either ·buy or exchange, unless he have suret:Y;
and witness; but if any one do so let the land-lord take possession of,
and hold the property, till it be known who rightfully owns it." 0 G
91 Such was the case also in th~ time of Glanvil; (Glanvil, Book X,) and probably
until about 144'"
sswmiston on Sales, 354; Pollock & Maitland's Hist. Eng. Law, II, p. 179·
91 Cf. Alfred and Guthrum's Pesee, 5.
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If an executed sale was not valid without formality, certainly a partially executed one was not.
That there was such a contract in use among the Anglo-Saxons
can hardly admit of doubt, though direct evidence on the subject is
lacking. Perhaps the strongest evidence is that in Germanic law
generally there were the two types of contract, the old formal, and
the "real." 97 In addition to that we have the law of GLANVIL to
appeal to.
In GLANVIL we find two distinct writs, one to summon a debtor,
and one to summon a surety.98 The latter was clearly to enforce
surety contracts; the former could not very well have been so used.
For where there was a surety, the surety only was liable, and not the
debtor, 99 and if the surety needed to get the debtor to court to
defend, that was his business and not the creditor's. It is possible
that the writ running against the debtor was invented to assist the
surety in such purpose, or to enable the surety to get reimbursement
from the debtor. But Debt i~ the king's courts was from the beginning brought against debtors, where there were no sureties.100
So we may be sure that there was a "delivery-promise" in GLANVIL's
time. How long it was in existence before that, we cannot say.
But taking into consideration other systems of Germanic law we
may take it that such a contract was enforceable for some centurie"
before GLANVIL.1 01.

VII.

THE WRI'tTEN CONTRACT.

A debt could be proved •by a charter or document.102 The document itself became a sufficient form in later times, but in the age
under consideration the writing was nothing more than proof,
taking the place of the necessity of pro{iucing witnesses.103 The
transaction which took place when the writing was delivered was
probably essentially the same as in the "delivery-promise." One
party delivered goods or chattels to the other, the latter instead of
making his promise orally before witnesses handed his promise over
Laughlin, p. 189.
os Glanvil, Book X, c. 2 and c. 4•
., Glanvil, Book X, c. 3.
1"' Glanvil, Book X, c. 2.
101 It does) not seem fair to argue from the wording of the oaths (see page - ,
supra), that there was a "delivery-promise." The oaths as pointed out clearly indicate
an issue between creditor and debtor, but still that is to be expected even in sureiy
contracts, for it was the debtor's business to defend.
102 Laughlin, 188.
102 Laughlin, 188.
01
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in writing. If a donation-was to be made in writing it was customary
for the donee to hand the donor something in exchange for the
writing.1oi

VIII.

TH:e EARNEST CONTRACT.

And finally, the. bi-lateral contract of bargain and sale entered
into with "earnest" requires mention. Its genealogy is clear. The
arrha or "earnest" is the Saxon wed. 105 The same ceremony which
W?S used to ·bind the surety was employed to ·bind the bargain. The
"earriest" contract was clearly a popular development from the
surety contract. But it was a late development. .In GLANv1r;'s time,
if he gives us a correct picture 'of the customary law, it was still unpledged,106 ci.nd even in BRAcToN's day it was in its infancy.107
.
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